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Neuropsychoanalysis explores experimentally and theoretically the philosophically ancient
discussion of the relation of mind and body, and seems well placed to overcome the
problem of a “mindless” neuroscience and a “brainless” psychology and psychotherapy,
especially when combined with a greater awareness that the body itself, not only the brain,
provides the material substrate for the emergent phenomenon we call mind. However, the
mind-brain-body is itself situated within a complex ecological world, interacting with other
mind-brain-bodies and the “non-human environment.”This occurs both synchronically and
diachronically as the organism and its environment (living and non-living) interact in highly
complex often non-linear ways. Psychoanalysis can do much to help unmask the anxieties,
deficits, conflicts, phantasies, and defenses crucial in understanding the human dimension
of the ecological crisis.Yet, psychoanalysis still largely remains not only a “psychology with-
out biology,” which neuropsychoanalysis seeks to remedy, but also a “psychology without
ecology.” Ecopsychoanalysis (Dodds, 2011b; Dodds and Jordan, 2012) is a new transdisci-
plinary approach drawing on a range of fields such as psychoanalysis, psychology, ecology,
philosophy, science, complexity theory, esthetics, and the humanities. It attempts to play
with what each approach has to offer in the sense of a heterogeneous assemblage of ideas
and processes, mirroring the interlocking complexity, chaos, and turbulence of nature itself.
By emphasizing the way the mind-brain-body studied by neuropsychoanalysis is embedded
in wider social and ecological networks, ecopsychoanalysis can help open up the relevance
of neuropsychoanalysis to wider fields of study, including those who are concerned with
what Wilson (2003) called “the future of life.”
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EMBEDDING THE MIND-BODY IN ECOLOGICAL SPACE
We are taking part in a planetary pyramid scheme, getting into an
ecological debt from which there can be no bail outs. We live on a
finite planet but have an economic system predicated on unend-
ing growth. Scientists estimate human demand already exceeded
the biosphere’s regenerative capacity in the 1980s (Wackernagel
et al., 2002, 926), yet somehow this just doesn’t hit home, our
behavior doesn’t match our knowledge. Why? This paper draws
on ideas from my recent book Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the
Edge of Chaos (Dodds, 2011a) to explore the possibility of a non-
linear ecopsychoanalysis (Dodds, 2011b) with which to respond
to a climate at the edge of chaos.
What do we see when we look at this famous painting by the
“wolfman” (Figure 1)? Well we know what Freud (1918) saw:
Daddy, penis, castration. He didn’t really see the wolves, the other
than human world. The wolves could only be stand-ins for the
totemic father, symbolic of human, all-too-human relationships.
Genosko (1993) and Deleuze and Guattari (2003a), point out that
Freud’s analysis enacts a reversal of the stare. From the dream
where the wolves are watching, intensely watching, the sleeping
child, it is now the human child watching the primal scene of his
parents copulating. He thus enacts a domestication of the animal
gaze, territorializing it into the affective economy of Oedipus,
thereby embodying aspects of our civilization’s relation to non-
human world. But what if we refuse this reversal? What happens
if we reflect on the terror and fascinating in the gaze of the wolves:
their “conversation of death” (Lopez, 1978)? What do the wolves
see when they look at us?
A key problem identified by ecopsychology is how to over-
come our experiential, academic, and scientific separation from
nature. In so far as the division of mind and body is central for
this divide, neuropsychoanalysis deserves to have a place in this
developing research. Neuropsychoanalysis explores experimen-
tally and theoretically the philosophically ancient discussion of the
relation of mind and body, an issue at the heart of psychoanaly-
sis from the start, with its early work on hysterical conversion
(Breuer and Freud, 1895; Freud, 1905a) and later developments
in the psychosomatics of the Paris School and beyond (Marty
et al., 1963; Aiesenstein and Rappoport de Aesemberg, 2010). Neu-
ropsychoanalysis seems well placed to overcome the problem of a
“mindless” neuroscience and a “brainless” psychology and psy-
chotherapy, especially when combined with a greater awareness
that the body itself, not only the brain, provides the material sub-
strate for the emergent phenomenon we call mind (Stora, 2007).
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FIGURE 1 | Painting by the “wolfman” (Segei Pankejeff 1886–1979),
from Freud (1918, 30).
However, there is a further term missed from this perspective,
which has more relevance now than ever, which is the fact that
the mind-brain-body is itself situated within a complex ecologi-
cal world, interacting with other mind-brain-bodies and with all
that psychoanalyst Searles (1960, 1972) referred to as the “non-
human environment.” This occurs both synchronically (webs of
interactions at a given moment in time) and diachronically (e.g.,
the interactions over evolutionary deep time), as the organism and
its environment (living and non-living) interact in highly complex
often non-linear ways.
Ecopsychology has argued that the split of mind from its wider
ecological matrix is as disastrous as the related Cartesian split
between mind and body, and is reflected in the current environ-
mental crises we face (Roszak et al., 1995; Buzzell and Chalquist,
2009). However, ecopsychology has problems of its own, in partic-
ular its tendency toward an “eco-mysticism” that a more engaged
relationship with the sciences of ecology, evolutionary biology,
and neuroscience (cognitive, social, affective, and developmental)
can help to counteract. The idea of the ecological body is a devel-
opment of ecopsychology’s suggestion of an “ecological self” and
an “ecological unconscious,” with ecological relations and attach-
ments seen as developing alongside more traditionally conceived
object relations (Jordan, 2009).
In our era of anxiety, denial, paranoia, apathy, guilt, and despair
in the face of climate change, there is an urgent need for a critical
dialog between psychoanalysis and ecology, for minding the eco-
logical body. Psychoanalysis can do much to help unmask the anx-
ieties, deficits, conflicts, phantasies, and defenses crucial in under-
standing the human dimension of the ecological crisis (Bigda-
Peyton, 2004; Randall, 2005; Morton, 2007; Žižek, 2007; Bodnar,
2008; Rust, 2008). Yet, psychoanalysis still largely remains not only
a “psychology without biology,” which neuropsychoanalysis seeks
to remedy, but also a “psychology without ecology.” This is the role
ecopsychoanalysis seeks to fulfill. While it includes applications of
psychoanalysis to ecological problems it seeks in addition to apply
ecological understandings and approaches to psychoanalysis. In
Dodds (2011a) I suggest there is a need for a meta-perspective to
help integrate the various levels (psychological, social, biological,
neurological, cultural, and ecological). The philosophy of Deleuze
and Guattari (2000, 2003a,b) combined with the sciences of com-
plexity (Bonabeau et al., 1999; Sole and Goodwin, 2000; Piers
et al., 2007) and the systems theory of Gregory Bateson (2000,
2002), help create a framework for integrating the diverse levels of
analysis required in any comprehensive attempt to deal with the
ecological crisis we now face.
Neuropsychoanalysis not only provides a more sophisticated
and integrated understanding of the mind-brain (including recent
advances from social neuroscience) necessary for any attempt to
deal with the psychology of the environmental crisis, it also offers
a model for how such a difficult interdisciplinary project might
work. In addition, by emphasizing the way the mind-brain-body
studied by neuropsychoanalysis is embedded in wider social and
ecological networks, ecopsychoanalysis can help open up the rel-
evance of neuropsychoanalysis to wider fields of study, including
those who are concerned with what Wilson (2003) called “the
future of life.” Ecopsychoanalysis (Dodds and Jordan, 2012) is a
new transdisciplinary approach to thinking about the relationship
between psychoanalysis, ecology, “the natural,” and the problem
of climate change. It draws on a range of fields including, psy-
choanalysis, psychology, ecology, philosophy, science, complexity
theory, esthetics, and the humanities. It attempts to play with
what each approach has to offer in the sense of a heterogeneous
assemblage of ideas and processes, mirroring the interlocking
complexity, chaos, and turbulence of nature itself.
DREAMING AT THE PRECIPICE
The climate crisis is also a crisis of theory. Academia has divided
human thought into a schizoid fragmented space but climate
change forces us to think transversally, about a world of unpre-
dictable, multiple-level, highly complex, non-linear interlocking
systems. There is therefore a need for a way of thinking able to
integrate the disparate strands of analysis, related to what Bion
(1984) calls the work of linking, connected with the alpha-function
and the dreamwork. Bion describes building links between mental
objects, and the attack on linking characteristic of psychosis. When
“alpha-function” is compromised we are left with undigested frag-
ments of experience: “beta-elements” incapable of being woven
into the tapestry of our psychic landscapes. We require a means of
linking diverse elements together without losing their specificity.
Here I turn to the non-linear sciences of complexity and
chaos (Figure 2), and the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari.
In his book Chaosmosis, Guattari (1995, 91) called for a general-
ized science of ecosystems or “ecosophy,” a generalized machinics
with “resonances, alliances, and feedback loops between various
regimes, signifying and non-signifying, human and non-human,
natural and cultural, material and representational.” In Dodds
(2011a), I argue there is as much a need to bring non-linear and
ecological thinking into psychoanalysis as for a psychoanalytic
approach to ecology, taking seriously the possibility of thinking
in terms of what Guattari (2000) called in his final book, The
Three Ecologies, the ecologies of mind, nature, and society.
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FIGURE 2 | Complexity as meta-theory.
Science has developed with the concept of linear systems but is
increasingly realizing these represent a special case in an otherwise
non-linear world. We can think about this in terms of attractors,
points toward which a system tends to converge. Any variation
in starting point within the basin of attraction is canceled out
by the powerful pull of the attractor. Within limits as our global
temperatures increases, negative feedback processes act to draw the
system back to a more central point, the point attractor (other more
complex attractors include “periodic” attractors and “strange” or
“chaotic” attractors). When moved toward the edge of the basin of
attraction we reach bifurcation points, where non-linearities rule
as the slightest difference in starting conditions or tiniest fluctua-
tion causes a radical shift, a phase transition to a new attractor or
set of attractors.
Scientists suggest our climate may be approaching several such
tipping points, or perhaps it has already begun, with poten-
tially lethal positive feedback processes no longer capable of being
damped out. A non-linear perspective is crucial not only for cli-
mate science (Sawaya, 2010) but for the psychology of climate
change. Our familiar ways of thinking assume a linear relation-
ship between CO2 emissions and a warming, that there will always
be time later to turn it around. This is a failure in our mental
ecology which leads, via pathological forms of social ecology, into
potential catastrophic collapses of natural ecology.
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Before exploring further the meshwork (DeLanda, 2005) for inte-
grating the three ecologies we need to begin with the ecology of
mind, and especially the ecology of affect, and thus, despite all its
faults, the territory of psychoanalysis. Freud (1927) claimed civ-
ilization arose to defend us against nature, but that the aim of
achieving total control over either our inner nature or the outer
world was a dangerous illusion to defend against feelings of help-
lessness and fear in the face of the awesome power of mother
nature, of acknowledging dependency on this largest of “holding
environments,” the ultimate “environment mother” (Winnicott,
1987).
Freud’s “eternal adversaries,” Eros, and Thanatos, are unfor-
tunately unlikely partners in their destructive effects on nature.
The “nirvana principle’s” desire for non-existence/annihilation
can be seen in our virtual indifference toward the world’s sixth
great mass extinction, and in the apocalyptic rhetoric of the envi-
ronmental movement and recent “eco-disaster” films. For Žižek
(2007) “The world without us” is. . .fantasy at its purest: witness-
ing the Earth itself retaining its pre-castrated state of innocence,
before we humans spoiled it with our hubris.” Eros, through over-
consumption and overpopulation, also works toward the potential
collapse of the biosphere (Bigda-Peyton, 2004). However, in the
form of “biophilia” (Wilson, 2003) Eros can work to reinvigo-
rate our love of nature which may help us turn back from the
brink.
To explore climate denial further, we can turn to a joke Freud
(1905b, 62) used to illustrate the logic of the unconscious (Freud,
1911; Matte-Blanco, 1998). When a man is told he should replace
a pot he borrowed and returned damaged, he refuses, claiming:
(1) I returned it undamaged. (2) The hole was there when you
gave it to me. (3) I never borrowed it! These mutually contra-
dictory answers alert us to unconscious processes united by the
motivation to remove the blame and prevent need for action,
and correspond well with arguments against action on climate
change.
1. There’s nothing wrong with the climate kettle: (here cli-
mate change is seen paranoiacally as a conspiracy by
UN/communists/Al Gore to destroy our freedom or instead
of capitalists trying to stop poor countries developing.) Alter-
natively,“the evidence is not conclusive” (the IPCC’s “unequiv-
ocal” is not unequivocal enough). While this may appear more
rational on the surface, in its own term it involves playing
Russian Roulette with the entire planet.
2. There was a hole in the planet when you gave it to me. (not caused
by humans, or caused by other humans, either way, not-me, not
my problem). However, unconscious deflection of guilt does
nothing to stop the disastrous consequences of climate change
so we would still need to take urgent action. One psychoana-
lytically interesting conclusion is at times people can fear guilt
more than their own, or everyone’s, destruction.
3. There is nothing we can do about it, also found in burnt out
environmentalists filled with feelings of despair and disem-
powerment, which Jungian ecopsychologist Rust (2008) calls
the “we’re completely fucked” defense, allowing us to give up
thinking.
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The different arguments relate to defenses against specific
anxieties. Its not happening involves more psychotic defenses
against paranoid-schizoid anxiety (extinction, annihilation). Its
not our/my fault involves neurotic defenses against depressive anx-
iety (difficulty in acknowledging human culpability and guilt).
There’s nothing I/we can do about it is closest to recognizing the
problem but without realistic reparative possibilities the individual
is stuck with the despair and pain of the depressive position with-
out hope. As Searles (1972, 366) put it, “instead of feeling isolated
within emotional depression, one feels at one with everyone. . . in
a “realistically” doomed world.” Such defenses need to be under-
stood not only individually, but as involving unconscious alliances
(Kaes, 2007) created socially, through small interactions at all levels
giving rise to social phantasy systems (Jaques, 1955). In complexity
theory, which Palombo (2007) suggests is a suitable ‘parent science’
for psychoanalysis this is an example of self-organization (SO),
where lower levels interact to form higher level structures embody-
ing emergent properties which then feedback to lower levels in a
process of ongoing recursivity.
OBJECT RELATIONS AND ECOLOGICAL RELATIONS
Object relations, emphasizing the self as constituted in and
through relational webs, moves psychoanalysis in an ecologi-
cal direction (Figure 3). Development involves moving from
“absolute dependence” to “mature dependence” (Fairbairn, 1992),
suggesting a vision for a more mature culture, with self and society
seen as inextricable from its relations to other beings, to ecological
webs, and to the Earth. For Searles (1972, 368) “an ecologically
healthy relatedness to our non-human environment is essential to
the development and maintenance of our sense of being human”
which has become “so undermined, disrupted, and distorted, con-
comitant with the ecological deterioration, that it is inordinately
difficult for us to integrate the feeling experiences, including the
losses, inescapable to any full-fledged human living.”
Traditionally, psychoanalysts would analyze environmental
concern as reflecting “deeper” feelings relating to human “objects,”
but human conflict could equally be a displacement from anxiety
concerning the environment. If we broaden Winnicott’s “holding
environment” to include the holding environment of the Earth,
we can understand how realizing the enormity of the crisis can
threaten psychological disintegration and collapse. Furthermore,
not only is environmentally damaging behavior a form of addic-
tion (e.g., consumer items functioning as Kohutian selfobjects
to shore up a fragile self, Kohut, 1985; Winnicott, 1987, 1999),
but addictions can also arise to deal with anxiety concerning our
damaged world as discussed by Susan Bodnar (2008). Psychoan-
alysts need to recognize engagement with ecology is not only for
“applied” psychoanalysis, but is crucial to its core clinical domain.
The phrase “Mother Earth” suggests our experience with the
planet relates to our experience with our (m)other. Not only feel-
ings of love and being held, but phantasies of an infinitely giving
Earth-breast we feel entitled to suck on with ever increasing inten-
sity without limit. Unable to tolerate weaning, our response to
ecological crisis includes rage, envy, and destructiveness, includ-
ing spoiling and omnipotent attacks on the earth-breast. Meltzer’s
(1994) “toilet-breast” concept is useful here. Psychologically the
FIGURE 3 | Object relations and ecological relations.
breast is not only a provider of nutrition, but a place where we
expel unbearable states of mind.
Various developmental levels may intersect with our problem-
atic relationship with nature. The apocalyptic threat of climate
change may evoke the extremely primitive persecutory anxi-
eties of Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position, leading to omnipotent
defenses to protect against feelings of helpless and fragmentation
(Jordan, 2009). The paranoia surrounding climate change allows
the “bad sadistic enemy” to be fought against “not in the soli-
tary isolation of the unconscious inner world, but in co-operation
with comrades-in-arms in real life” (Jaques, 1955, 483). Searles
(1972) points out that ironically there is now a certain objectivity
to schizophrenic “end of the world” fantasies. This can lead many
to intuitively feel ecological warnings are “crazy” and we shouldn’t
listen to them, partly out of fear of contamination because they
touch a “crazy” part of all of us.
At the phallic-Oedipal level, Searles (1972, 364) identifies phan-
tasies of eliminating Oedipal rivals (inc. future generations) and
the “moralistic” tone of much ecological writing involving pro-
jecting Oedipal guilt, accusing us of raping mother earth. In
addition, through relentless advertising, possessions such as cars
have become symbols of (male) genital achievement and initia-
tives to reduce car use can feel like castration (Randall, 2005). The
ecological version of Klein’s (1987) depressive position involves
mourning for environmental destruction, guilt for the damage
done, a growing awareness the lifestyles and civilization we are
so proud of are causing such damage to planetary ecosystems,
and a reparative drive to restore, repair, and recreate the lost and
damaged world (internal and external).
The environmental crisis forces us to face the traumatic aspects
of transience, that nothing is permanent. Drawing on Freud’s
(1916) concept of anticipatory mourning, we might expect indi-
viduals and societies to adopt positions of consciously not caring
about the environment or even our species survival, or becoming
actively destructive and self-destructive, as a defense against the
mourning yet to come. Alternatively we may engage in a prema-
ture anticipatory mourning, falling into a despair preventing the
very action which might avoid the feared loss, while there is still
time. Freud (1916, 306) urges us to face with honesty and courage
Frontiers in Psychology | Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis March 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 125 | 4
Dodds Minding the ecological body: neuropsychoanalysis and ecopsychoanalysis
the fact that: “[a] time may indeed come when the pictures and
statues which we admire to-day will crumble to dust, or a race of
men may follow us who no longer understand the works of our
poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch may even arrive when
all animate life upon the earth ceases.” In the face of the enor-
mous pain and fear the ecological crisis evokes, we need to find
effective means of reparation, to restore, and recreate the damaged
world, inside and out. Without hope that meaningful, as opposed
to manic, reparation is possible, we have only the choice between
denial, madness, and despair. As psychoanalysis opens itself up to
a greater awareness of the web of life, the object-related self and
the narcissistic self needs to be viewed as developing alongside the
ecological self.
BIOPHILIA AND BIOPHOBIA
While ecopsychology in its classic form is in danger of creating a
new mysticism or a new religion, there is much of value within the
tradition so we shall see what symbioses can occur in this ecol-
ogy of ideas. Where Freud saw the oceanic feeling as “something
like the restoration of the limitless narcissism,” Roszak et al. (1995,
12) instead sees it as reclaiming the repressed of the ecological
unconscious. This is connected to what the zoologist Wilson calls
“biophilia” “the innately emotional affiliation of human beings
to other living organisms” (Kellert and Wilson, 1993) (Figure 4),
a consequence of our long evolution and adaptation to the nat-
ural world and for Wilson (2003) a crucial force in countering the
biodiversity crisis.
Wilson’s actual claim is less global than his ecopsychologi-
cal readers often assume. In particular, the innate preference we
seem to have for natural environments refers specifically to certain
kinds of natural environments, the ecology our species evolved to
live within, predominantly savanna environments and transitional
woodland and it is therefore ultimately an argument underpinned
by evolutionary theory, and one which for Wilson (2003, 137) con-
nects esthetics to biology via the pleasures arising from our evolved
brain.
However, Wilson (2003, 137) emphasizes we should not under-
stand this as hardwiring, but rather that we are predisposed to
find certain environments preferable to others:“Psychologists who
study mental development say that we are hereditarily prepared to
learn certain behaviors and counter prepared to learn others.” For
example, the “vast majority of humans. . . are prepared to learn
the lyrics of a song but counter prepared to learn calculus.” Cru-
cially for psychoanalytic and ecopsychological perspectives, such
preparedness usually involves “sensitive periods during childhood
and early maturity in which learning and distaste are most easily
picked up.”
Thus, Wilson’s biophilia is something that can be learned,
encouraged, and developed. It refers not to a fixed instinct but
an innate tendency toward a connection with the natural world
which can be nurtured or not, especially during the crucial stages
of child development of such interest to psychoanalysts. He goes
on to describe the stages of the acquisition of biophilia which can
be interestingly compared to Freud’s work on children’s relations
with animals (Genosko, 1993). Although Wilson does not say this,
in some ways we could describe our culture as remaining stuck
within the first stage of the development of biophilia.
FIGURE 4 | Biophila and biophobia.
The critical states in the acquiring of biophilia have been
worked out by psychologists during studies of childhood
mental development. Under the age of six, children tend to be
egocentric, self-serving, and domineering in their responses
to animals and nature. They are also most prone to be uncar-
ing or fearful of the natural world and of all but a few familiar
animals. Between six and nine, children become interested in
wild creatures for the first time, and aware that animals can
suffer pain and distress. From 9 to 12 their knowledge and
interest in the natural world rises sharply, and between 13 and
17 they readily acquire moral feeling toward animal welfare
and species conservation (Wilson, 2003, 137–138).
The timing of these stages obviously show a fairly large variability
among individuals. It is also worth exploring the developmen-
tal stages of children’s relation to the environment as a whole.
This research supports other findings we shall study below, when
we will review the significant health benefits (psychological and
physical) of living near green spaces, for children and adults. Stud-
ies show that children tend to move from confining themselves
to the immediate vicinity of their home and the small crea-
tures found there (around age four) to exploring “nearby woods,
fields, ditches, and other unclaimed spots they can claim as their
own” (Wilson, 2003, 138) between approximately the ages of 8
and 11.
As Wilson (2003:, 138) writes, drawing on Sobel’s (2001) book
Children’s Special Places, here they“often build some kind of shelter
such as a tree house, fort, or cave where they can read magazines,
eat lunch, conspire with a friend. . . play games, and spy on the
world.” If natural environments are not available, as for exam-
ple in areas such as East Harlem, children will instead build forts
“in culverts, alleyways, basements, abandoned warehouses, rail-
road right-of-ways, and hedges.” The secret places of childhood,
connect us to place, and help in our psychological development.
Importantly for Sobel, “if played out in natural environments,
they also bring us close to the earth and nature in ways that can
engender a lifelong love of both.”
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However, if we accept that biophilia is an innate tendency in
human nature, we must also accept the possibility, or even the
likelihood, that “biophobia” is just as natural. This is a subject
that ecopsychologists are often conspicuously absent in address-
ing. This deep acceptance of the ambiguity of our relationship
with nature found in Wilson, is something perhaps Freud would
have appreciated. As Wilson (2003, 141) writes, throughout “most
of human deep history there have been predators eager to snatch
us for dinner; venomous snakes ready with a fatal, defensive strike
to the ankle; spiders and insects that bite, sting, and infect; and
microbes designed to reduce the human body to malodorous
catabolic chemicals. . .the reverse side of nature’s green-and-gold
is the black-and-scarlet of disease and death.” In a similar way
to biophilia, our biophobic tendencies can be encouraged and
further developed, or reduced and alleviated, through critical
developmental experience.
At one end of the scale are mild distaste and feelings of appre-
hension. At the other end are full-blown clinical phobias that
fire the sympathetic nervous system and produce panic, nau-
sea, and cold sweat. The innate biophobic intensities are most
readily evoked by sources of peril that have existed in the nat-
ural world throughout humanity’s evolutionary past. They
include heights, close spaces, running water, snakes, wolves,
rats and mice, bats, spiders, and blood. (Wilson, 2003, 141).
Such prepared learning is generally not found for contemporary
threats which are objectively far more dangerous such as frayed
wires, guns, or cars. In ways compatible with psychoanalysis, the
expression of such fears can occur unconsciously. For example
when psychologists flash images of spiders or snakes subliminally
(15–30 ms), subjects already conditioned negatively to these par-
ticular natural “threats” react physically (for example by facial
muscle changes) without consciously registering the experience
at all (Wilson, 2003, 142).
Biophilia and biophobia can be understood as the ecopsycho-
logical equivalent of Freud’s (1920), Eros, and Thanatos. For more
research on the development of biophobia and biophilia, see for
example Kellert and Wilson (1993), Orr (1994), Wilson (2003). In
Dodds (2011a) I also explore biophobia from the point of view of
an ecopsychologically sensitive psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic
approach to the becoming-animal theme in horror films (Creed,
2005; Powell, 2006) and its clinical manifestation in the form of
animal phobias (Freud, 1909).
ECOPSYCHOLOGY AND HEALTH
Ecopsychologists have been interested in studying the psycholog-
ical impacts of life in an age of ecological crisis. Heinberg (2009,
198) suggests that in this context we need also to consider the idea
of eco-grief, the feelings of loss connected to ecological devastation
and the threatened loss of a whole way of life, which one way or
another, is about to come to an end, in what he calls pre-traumatic
stress disorder, related in many ways to Freud’s (1916) anticipa-
tory mourning. He suggests a psychological approach using the
stages of grief described in the well-known Kübler-Ross (1973,
2005) model (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance)
to understand where we are as a society and as individuals. From
this perspective, different types of interventions might be more or
FIGURE 5 | Physical and psychological health and natural spaces.
less “effective for helping people accept our situation, depending
on their current stage of adjustment” (Heinberg, 2009, 198). He
suggests, however, that the classic stages are not enough, because
beyond acceptance there needs to be action, not only due to the
ecological urgency, but because accepting “the reality all too often
leads to depression and despair.”
Although Santostefano (2008) cautions us against a naïve ver-
sion of ecopsychology that assumes nature automatically gen-
erates a sense of well-being and improvements in physical and
mental health, there does seem to be an increasing amount of
empirical evidence to support the contention that nature heals
(e.g., Mind, 2007; Chalquist, 2009) (Figure 5). Researchers from
the VU University Medical Center in Amsterdam recently con-
ducted a large study of 3,50,000 people showing that living near
green spaces had substantial physical and mental health bene-
fits (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2009). The greatest ben-
efits were for those living less than a kilometer away and the
largest positive impacts were on anxiety disorders and depres-
sion. Living near green areas reduced depression rates by 21%
for children under 12. Physical disorders, such as heart disease,
diabetes, stomach and respiratory infections, and neck, shoul-
der, back, wrist and hand complaints, also showed substantial
improvements. In addition, research by Ulrich (1984) has shown
that the view from a hospital window (whether natural or con-
crete) has a significant and measurable effect on the speed and
completeness of a patients recovery (Ulrich, 1984; Verderber and
Reuman, 1987).
Further evidence supports the therapeutic effect of nature and
thus further confirms Wilson’s (2003) biophilia hypothesis. Wilson
(2003, 139–140) summarizes some of these findings:
120 volunteers were shown a stressful movie, followed
by videotapes of either natural or urban settings. . .they
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recovered from the feeling of stress more quickly while
experiencing the natural settings. . .supported by four stan-
dard physiological measures of stress: heartbeat, systolic
blood pressure, facial muscle tension, and electrical skin
conductance. . . Studies of response prior to surgery and den-
tal work have consistently revealed a significant reduction of
stress in the presence of plants and aquaria. . . Postsurgical
patients recover more quickly, suffer fewer minor complica-
tions, and need smaller dosages of painkillers if given a win-
dow view of open terrain or waterscape. In one Swedish study
covering fifteen years. . .clinically anxious psychiatric patients
responded positively to wall pictures of natural environ-
ments, but negatively. . .to most other decorations. . . Com-
parable studies in prisons revealed that inmates provided
window views of nearby farmlands and forests, as opposed to
prison yards, reported fewer stress-related symptoms such as
headaches and indigestion.
Pets can also have a major positive impact on our health, as inde-
pendent research in Australia, England, and the United States has
shown. Wilson (2003, 140) writes that“one Australian study, which
factored out variation in exercise levels, diet, and social class, pet
ownership accounted for a statistically significant reduction of
cholesterol, triglycerides, and systolic blood pressure” while in a
similar US study “survivors of heart attacks. . .who owned dogs
had a survival rate six times higher than those who did not” (Wil-
son, 2003, 140). Unfortunately, cat ownership did not provide the
same positive effects. For more information on the health effects
of pets and natural environments, see Ulrich (1991, 1999, 2000),
Ulrich et al. (1991), Kellert and Wilson (1993), Frumkin (2001)
and Frumkin and Louv (2007).
Following a review of this increasingly impressive body of
evidence, the mental health charity Mind (2007) strongly sup-
ported the benefits of “ecotherapy” and called for the “greening”
of mental health provision. This has lead a number of ther-
apists, including those coming from traditional psychoanalytic
backgrounds, to explore the possibility of “ecotherapy,” which
covers a wide variety of approaches, including taking psychother-
apy outside the traditional consulting room into the outdoors
(Buzzell, 2009). Jodran and Marshall (2010, 345) explore the
various complex clinical factors involved in such a shift, in par-
ticular focusing on its impact on boundaries and the therapeutic
frame (as both emotional and geographical space) from a rela-
tional perspective. Here, the “relational encounter within the
dynamic nature of the natural world can provide rich opportu-
nities for a new experiencing with immediacy for both therapist
and client, all of which can be fed in to the therapeutic process”
(Jodran and Marshall, 2010, 349). Moving outdoors may also
enhance mutuality (not identical with equality), given that the
space within which therapy occurs is not owned by the thera-
pist, and the process of choosing different terrain can become
more a co-created ongoing experience within the therapeutic
relationship. Placing therapy outdoors results in the normal sta-
tic “backdrop” of therapy becoming “a living presence. . .(where)
therapist and client are constantly aware of (both consciously
and unconsciously), and responding to, the presence of this
vibrant living third in the dynamic” (Jodran and Marshall, 2010,
353–354).
DARK ECOLOGY: ECOLOGY WITHOUT NATURE?
In contrast with the call for reconnection at the heart of ecopsycho-
logical theory and practice, Morton’s (2007) plea for an “ecology
without nature” uses ecocriticism to deconstruct the ecological
imaginary, helping us become more aware of how we use “nature”
psychologically in ways which get in the way of genuine environ-
mental practice. For Žižek our very idea of “Nature” is a problem:
“there is no big Other (self-contained symbolic order as the ulti-
mate guarantee of Meaning); there is also no Nature qua balanced
order of self-reproduction whose homeostasis is disturbed. . .by
imbalanced human interventions. . .what we need is ecology with-
out nature: the ultimate obstacle to protecting nature is the very
notion of nature we rely on.” An example of the “end of nature” is
Morton’s (2010) claim that the “weather conversation” no longer
functions. In our era of global warming, weather (as background)
no longer exists, it now becomes a mere cipher for that threatening
hyper-object we call “climate.” For Morton, without background
the foreground also disappears, and rather than retreating into
comforting fantasies of “Hobbit-like” Heideggerian “life-worlds,”
he encourages us to embrace dark ecology involving a“melancholic
ethics.”
However, there is a danger ecocritique can remove a primary
motivation of the environmental movement. Discourses of“nature
no longer existing” may feed into psychological defenses by argu-
ing that as “nature” is already so altered by human activity that
“wilderness” doesn’t really exist, there is no reason to protect a
nature which has no substance.”In addition, this approach can lose
sight of the fact that the ecological crisis ultimately reaches beyond
any linguistic constructions, and is not itself a “text” which can be
“deconstructed,” but a “Real” beyond language, traumatically rup-
turing the Symbolic order. Deconstructive approaches also have
difficulty in giving ontological space to nature and the material
as anything other than an effect of language, or its negation as
the “Real.”
With their mixed semiotics, Herzogenrath (2008, 3) claims
a Deleuzo–Guattarian ecology “allows for the incorporation of
the workings of the ‘repressed’ of representation. . .of the ‘real’,
of ‘nature’ ”. According to Bonta and Protevi (2004, 4), Deleuze
and Guattari’s engagement with complexity theory “helps break
free of the postmodernist trap by rethinking sense and refer-
ence,” shattering “postmodernist equations of signs with signi-
fiers,” such that “at critical thresholds. . .physical and biological
systems can be said to ‘ense’ the differences in their environ-
ment that trigger self-organizing processes.” A non-linear read-
ing of Deleuze and Guattari offers not with a flight into eco-
mysticism, or a naïve positivist reductionism, or even a post-
modernist play of signifiers, but an “intelligent materialism,” a
“geophilosophy.”
COMPLEXITY THEORY AND SELF-ORGANIZATION
[W]hat would thinking be if it did not constantly confront
chaos?. . . chaos has three daughters. . .the Chaoids – art, sci-
ence, and philosophy. . . [Each] cut through the chaos in
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FIGURE 6 | Self-organization and swarm intelligence.
different ways. The brain is the junction – not the unity – of
the three planes (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003b, 208).
Complexity and chaos theories have strong implications for psy-
choanalysis (Palombo, 2007; Piers et al., 2007) and have “changed
the basic concept of the human mind itself” (Guastello, 2004,
4), providing a new way of thinking about the three ecolo-
gies. Concepts such as “phase space” embody complex rela-
tionships and dynamic processes of change, providing what
Deleuze and Guattari call an “abstract machine,” embodying
a structural pattern of relationships in many separate het-
erogeneous domains. For Deleuze and Guattari (2003a, 514),
“every abstract machine is linked to other abstract machines,
not only because they are inseparably political, economic, sci-
entific, artistic, ecological, cosmic – perceptive, affective, active,
thinking, physical, and semiotic – but because their vari-
ous types are as intertwined as their operations are conver-
gent.”
Self-Organization, deriving partly from for example studies of
social insects, occurs when global patterns emerge from interac-
tions among lower level components rather than being imposed
from outside the system, or any type of “leader,” the “solution
without a General” in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms. For Palombo
(1999, 24) SO is “the most significant missing ingredient in psy-
choanalytic theory,” showing how small pieces of insight self-
organize into ever larger structures. As Sole and Goodwin (2000,
18) write “Self-organizing behavior emerges unpredictably in sys-
tems at different levels” with emergent properties which “provide
the recognition that nature can be creative while denying the
occurrence of miracles.” The functions as an “abstract machine,”
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2003a) embodying a structural pattern
of relationships occurring in many separate registers, includ-
ing the psychological, ecological, and social of Guattari’s (2000)
three ecologies. Supporting Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that
every individual is fundamentally a pack, the mind/brain itself
is increasingly being studied through the virtual diagram of the
swarm (Figure 6).
[L]ike the brain, the colony is formed by many individ-
uals in interaction; individual units can switch from one
type of activity to others; they can fail or be removed with-
out any harm to the collective. . .the main differences arise
from connectivity: direct contact between individual ants
is a transient phenomenon, whereas synaptic connections
among neurons usually have a long lifetime. . . This is par-
tially compensated (particularly in large colonies) by the use
of chemicals, which can create spatial structures that clearly
involve long-term memory effects (Sole and Goodwin, 2000,
148–149).
Gordon (1999) suggests a similar pattern can be found behind
“molecular interactions within a living cell, the unfolding pattern
of cells and tissues in an embryo, and the activity of the neurons
that produce the mind.” Any complex system can be viewed as a
morphogenetic cascade, which can include flows from all registers.
Thus we can see how the scientific apparatus of complexity theory,
along with the philosophical perspective of Deleuze and Guattari
can help to provide a meta-perspective from which to connect the
various levels of mind, brain, society, ecology, and climate, which
this book argues is necessary to allow joined-up-thinking on the
topic of climate change and the psychological dimensions of the
ecological crisis.
LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS
Climate change is sometimes referred to as“climate chaos”because
of the increasingly unpredictable nature of natural systems. A non-
linear perspective is thus crucial for climate science, but it also
provides ways of engaging with the crisis on the social and psy-
chological levels. Chaos theory shows us paradoxically, that chaos
is far from the opposite of order and structure. Chaos is a fea-
ture of all non-linear systems, which show us that traditional
linear approaches to scientific analysis only describe a special
case situation within a larger non-linear world. As Deleuze and
Guattari (2003b, 119) write, “Science is haunted not by its own
unity but. . .by all the limits or borders through which it confronts
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FIGURE 7 |The march to chaos (Camazine et al., 2001).
chaos.” We can see this relation between chaos and non-linearity
in the ‘period doubling’ route to chaos, seen in a wide range of
systems describing everything from population growth to fluid
dynamics. In Figure 7, we can see that as the growth parameter ‘r’
is increased we move from a ‘point attractor’ (one steady state the
system tends to converge on whatever the starting point) to peri-
odic attractors (period 2, then 4, then 8, etc.) with each subsequent
‘bifurcation’, coming increasingly rapidly, until the whole system
moves beyond the periodic attractor to the ‘strange’ or chaotic
attractor (in the right hand region of the picture). According to
Camazine et al. (2001, 43):
As r [the growth rate parameter] is increased. . .the system
not only fails to reach a stable value but also does not oscil-
late among a number of fixed values. Instead, no pattern
occurs. . . The system is said to be chaotic. . . [involving a
“strange” or chaotic attractor]. . . Deterministic chaos is the
unpredictable behavior of a non-linear system within a cer-
tain parameter range. . . What is so unexpected, however, is
that a deterministic equation can yield unpredictable results.
Chaos is essential for SO as the latter involves the amplification
through positive feedback of fluctuations created by phenomena
such as“random walks, errors, random task-switching”(Bonabeau
et al., 1999, 10). The fact that ants regularly get lost used to puzzle
scientists who wondered why this “inefficiency” wasn’t eliminated
by evolution, but lost foragers can sometimes find new food
sources and therefore randomness enhances the creativity of a
system or what Bateson (2000) calls its ecological flexibility. This
is true in psychological, social, biological, and even non-living
systems such as swarm robotics.
Similarly, and counter-intuitively, studies of electroencephalo-
grams (EEG’s), electrocardiograms (ECG’s), and other biorhyth-
mic measurements, show healthy rhythms have greater turbulence
or irregularity (complexity) whereas “unhealthy systems gravitate
toward periodic and simplistic output” (Guastello, 2004). Chaos
also plays a crucial role in brain dynamics, an area increasingly
explored by neuropsychoanalysis (Grigsby and Stevens, 2000).
We can also see examples from birds of what Deleuze and
FIGURE 8 | Affect and attractor landscapes (Panksepp, 2005).
Guattari (2003a) call the territorializing effects of the familiar.
Skarda and Freeman (1987, 161–195) see chaos “as an emer-
gent property of intrinsically unstable neural masses.” Sole and
Goodwin (2000, 138) explain how “chaotic (brain) dynamics
(as shown by the observed strange attractors) represented the
normal state when the animal was attentive” but that “these
attractors underwent dramatic changes when some familiar odor
was introduced” resulting in much more ordered neural fluc-
tuation. The spatiotemporal pattern “exhibited a well-defined
stable structure. . .characteristic for the specific odor” (Sole and
Goodwin, 2000, 138).
On the emotional level, Panksepp (2004), a pioneer of affec-
tive neuroscience and neuropsychoanalysis, argues that the basic
emotion systems in the mammalian brain (see Figure 8) form
attractor landscapes involving vast assemblages of neurons oper-
ating at far-from-equilibrium states. Paradoxically the non-linear
processes of chaos give rise to stability by allowing the system to
creatively adapt to environmental change, something increasingly
urgent in our current crisis.
We can understand more fully the function of chaos through
its border with more stable states, a regiom called the edge of
chaos. Living systems attempt to balance themselves on the frac-
tal border zone between stability and instability which provides
maximum ecological flexibility, producing the dissipative system
of life. Dissipative systems are open systems in constant recipro-
cal interaction with and adaptation to their environments and
exist at far-from-equilibrium conditions where they can main-
tain themselves within a dynamically ordered structure. In ant
colonies, for example, it has been noted that at a critical density
“random individual activations become able to propagate through
the whole colony, but the density is low enough to prevent activity
from remaining a long time in the system” (Sole and Goodwin,
2000, 164). This is a fundamental challenge to long-held West-
ern philosophical and scientific views on the relation between
order and chaos as order arises from chaos in a specific scientific
sense.
Kelso’s (1995, 26) work suggests that the brain “is a self-
organizing, pattern-forming system that operates close to insta-
bility points, thereby allowing it to switch flexibly and spon-
taneously from one coherent state to another. . .by living near
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criticality, the brain is able to anticipate the future, not sim-
ply react to the present.” This can also be understood as a
dynamic interplay between Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003a) deterri-
torialization/territorialization systems in constant flux. Camazine
et al. (2001, 26) argues that “with such SO, environmental
randomness can act as the ‘imagination of the system,’ the raw
material from which structures arise” with fluctuations acting
“as seeds from which patterns and structures are nucleated and
grow.”
This principle can be seen as valid in all three of Guattari’s
three ecologies of mind, society, and nature and has been applied
to phenomena as far apart as organizational behavior (Doo-
ley, 1997) and communication dynamics within families (Pincus,
2001). As Guastello (2004, 6) writes “The general principle is that
the organism is a complex adaptive system, and that the turbu-
lence or complexity in its behavior allows for the broadest range
of adaptive responses.” With chaos, biology becomes no longer
the “bedrock” on top of which separate psychological and social
worlds form, because the brain is itself formed through non-linear
interactions with the world, culture, and experience (Edelman,
2006).
In mental ecology, Marks-Tarlow (2004) reconfigures the psy-
choanalytic model of the self as a dynamical system, while Busch
(2007, 429) describes pathological infantile attractors as “black
holes in psychological space, sucking in everything in that comes
near its orbit, remaining outside of awareness and thus unable to be
modified by other structures.” Psychoanalysis can be understood
as a coevolutionary system (Palombo, 1999) a “destabilization”
of such attractors in psychic space, changing point, and periodic
attractors to chaotic attractors. While most change is confined
to the local level and absorbed by wider psychic defenses, as the
system reaches self-organized criticality (Bak and Chen, 1991) the
tiniest local shift can precipitate cascades of disorder through the
entire system. Such models of dynamic change are also crucial
for understanding the psychological and social shifts in human
responses to ecological crisis.
In social ecology and group analysis, Stacey (2006), argues that
Bion’s (1961) work group and basic assumption groups inter-
act to create regions of stability and disintegration, with poten-
tially creative fractal regions of bounded instability at the edge
of chaos between them. Non-linear fractal geometry undermines
any clear line between inside and outside, providing new ways
to think about the individual and group in terms of multidi-
mensional fractal border zones. Similarly, Jaques’ (1955) social
phantasy systems can be understood as emerging through the
SO of individual defenses, with global patterns feeding back to
effect lower levels recursively. The nonlinear dynamical systems
approach to intrapsychic, interpersonal and group psychodynam-
ics also offers the rich possibility for modelling these complex
systems using computer-based modelling techniques, something
I call ‘artificial group psychodynamics’ (Dodds, 2009), allowing
us to explore the parameters of our theories in a new form of
empirical research.
For an example of a non-linear social phantasy ecosystem
in climate change we can turn to Randall’s (2005) discussion
of the non-active majority who project environmental concern
onto activists functioning as containers for the split-off collective
environmental superego. A non-linear social systems perspec-
tive lets us explore the affective feedback loops carried around
the circuit with complex social and psychological effects, as
projective and introjective identifications, splittings, and scape-
goating, reverberate back and forth in new iterations as the
system moves forward in time, as other individuals and groups
get drawn in, either damping-out the mad oscillations (Bion,
1961) or getting swept up in non-linear amplification effects.
Randall (2005, 176–177) suggests that as collective guilt becomes
more shared, it can be “managed in more creative ways,” becom-
ing “less persecutory and destructive” where projections are
reduced and a larger non-psychotic space created for repara-
tive action. This embodies a system of multistability, with com-
plex movements between basins of attraction as internal objects
and affects flow through the network, with major shifts between
states, sometimes after long periods when the system seems stuck
despite the best efforts to destabilize it by pushing it toward a
bifurcation.
GEOPHILOSOPHY AND THE FUTURE OF THE THREE
ECOLOGIES
Here, we can draw on the evolutionary model of a “fitness land-
scape,” where each helpful mutation moves the species closer to
a local adaptive peak, while the fitness landscape itself constantly
morphs in new directions with the ebb and flow of evolution-
ary time. Just as a species can get “stuck” at a local optimum
in the fitness landscape, a psychoanalytic patient is sometimes
unable to make the temporary regression required to find new
more creative ways of living (Palombo, 1999, 114). This is a novel
account of “resistance” in psychotherapy and deadlocks in the
wider culture concerning climate change, suggesting an inabil-
ity to leave a local peak even when long-term consequences may
be disastrous.
Using complexity theory, we can see our current period as
showing disorder and instability in some areas, while seeming
stuck and frozen in others. The first can feel frightening, the
latter deadening and demoralizing (Marks-Tarlow, 2008). Peri-
ods of instability are “natural and necessary stages on the path
toward greater SO” (Eidelson, 1997, 68) but with no guarantee
that what emerges will be more adaptive. From a clinical point
of view, it is interesting to note that there can be pathological,
aberrant patterns in swarms (Camazine et al., 2001, 282). What
this research shows is that in a highly complex and interconnected
system, relatively small changes of one parameter can have unpre-
dictable (and disastrous) effects on the whole. This has important
implications for the effect of climate change on the social, psycho-
logical, climate, and ecological systems in Guattari’s (2000) three
ecologies.
This can bring a complexity based approach to Jared Diamond’s
(2006) research on the collapse of civilizations, and the important
roles he uncovered for systemic social interconnectivity, environ-
mental damage, and climate change. Crucially for us, many of
these societies entered the period of collapse shortly after reaching
to their apogee of power and wealth. The Anasazi Chaco soci-
ety in North America, for example, built the tallest buildings in
that continent prior to Chicago’s scrapers of the 1880s. Following
centuries of development, their advanced society collapsed rapidly
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FIGURE 9 | Integrating different spatiotemporal scales.
in one decade after reaching its peak, between the years 1110 and
1120. Climate change appears to have played an important part
in the rise and fall of many previous civilizations, including ones
as mighty as Rome (Buntgen et al., 2011). We do not yet know
whether our own civilization will share the fate of many that have
gone before, but we would do well to grasp the complex non-
linear effects involved. Complexity theory lets us understand how
psychological, natural, and social ecologies are organized, and how
fragile they can be.
We still do not know why civilizations collapse. We need some
new explorers able to penetrate the jungles of complexity
and find the theories that will help us locate ourselves in our
complex world. . .a fascinating but counterintuitive universe,
a non-linear and unpredictable world operating by rules still
to be discovered. . . They will tell us more than we can imag-
ine about our brains and societies. . .Let us remember, when
walking through the ruins of those great ancient cities. . .that
they all had something in common: a long time ago, their cit-
izens believed that those cities and those civilizations would
last forever (Sole and Goodwin, 2000, 302).
Complexity and chaos theory shows how in certain conditions,
even minor changes can produce dramatic effects. The task for
change, whether in psychoanalysis or social systems, then becomes
experimental, including the search for “lever points” to open up
the possibilities of more radical transformation. As Deleuze and
Guattari, 2003a, 161) write:
This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum,
experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advan-
tageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritori-
alization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce
flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of
intensities segment by segment. . . It is through a meticu-
lous relation with the strata that one succeeds in freeing lines
of flight.
Deleuzo–Guattarian philosophy is one of becoming rather
than being. Everything, from mountains to bodies to languages
represent merely temporary hardenings or slowing down of the
vast flow of becoming. DeLanda’s assemblage theory helps to sit-
uate this philosophy alongside the sciences of complexity and
chaos. It studies how structures at all levels emerge through their
interacting components. For DeLanda (2006, 119) this allows us to
integrate insights from all spatiotemporal scales (Figure 9), form-
ing“a chorus that does not harmonize its different components but
interlocks them while respecting their heterogeneity.” Assemblage
theory provides a way to approach all three of Guattari’s ecologies,
in a dense heterarchy (Wilson and Holldobler, 1988) of connectiv-
ity, where a“territorial assemblage opens onto a social assemblage”
which is also “connected to cosmic forces” and “pulsations of the
earth” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2003a, 549).
Deleuze and Guattari create a vision of a world, according to
DeLanda where “geology, biology, and linguistics are not seen as
three separate spheres” but as “coexisting and interacting flows”
where“one stratum can serve directly as a substratum for another.”
As Deleuze and Guattari (2003a, 69) put it, “a semiotic fragment
rubs shoulders with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes
into a language.” Deleuze and Guattari follow Bateson toward an
ecology of mind leading to new ways of understanding subjectivity,
where fallacies in the ecology of ideas have direct and catastrophic
results on the social and ecological registers such that “there is an
ecology of bad ideas, just as there is an ecology of weeds” (Bateson,
2000, 492).
In our current ecological crisis we must face the possibility that
achieving the necessary ecological flexibility to survive requires a
fundamental re-examination of the basic coordinates of our lives.
Like the patient stuck on a local optimum, unable or unwilling to
cross the threshold to a more adaptive peak, entire species, and
civilizations have in the past found themselves in dangerous dead
ends; including those within the ecology of mind, ways of thinking,
and being that become pathological if they fail to evolve along with
the constantly shifting relations in the constitution of natural and
social ecosystems. The contribution of psychoanalysis is to help
us overcome such errors of thought through investigating their
unconscious roots. Although there may be many defensive rea-
sons to not know (Bion’s), we are starting to become conscious of
the enormity of the danger which confronts us. The non-linearity
and chaos of nature, and the forms of thinking required to sustain
our relationship to it beyond the limited horizons of our experi-
ence, are both frightening and liberating. Yet, despite the anxiety,
guilt, and terror that climate change forces us to face, this crisis
can offer us an opportunity for a more open vision of ourselves, as
subjects, as societies, and as a species, among the interconnected
life systems of the Earth.
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